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INTRODUCTION
The domain name <business.com> was auctioned for an
unprecedented $7.5 million;1 <loans.com> was sold for $3
million;2 and <wine.com> fetched $2.9 million.3 The domain
name <sex.com> is rumored to be worth at least $250 million.4
Hotels.com invested close to $55 million in an advertising
campaign launched on broadcast and cable networks.5 What all of
these costly domain names have in common is that they are short,
easy to remember, and extremely valuable branding tools for ebusinesses.6 The Wall Street Journal’s last tally in 2000 revealed
1

Lee Gomes, Today, Ventures Pick Names That Are Short and Have Global Ring,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2003, at A13.
2
Loans.com Web Address Auctioned for $3 Million, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2000, at B6.
3
Gail Robinson, You Paid How Much for That Domain Name?, Web Developer’s
Journal, at http://webdevelopersjournal.com/articles/domain_names.html (Feb. 3, 2000)
(providing a list of some of the most expensive domain names). Another example of a
high priced domain name is <autos.com>, which was sold to an online car sales company
for $2.2 million. See id.; Robert Frank, How Music.com Found Itself a Hot Address,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2000, at B1. Additionally, an entertainment company recently
bought the domain name <men.com> for $1.3 million. See Associated Press, Domain
Names Once Again Fetch Top Dollar (Dec. 25, 2003), available at CNN.com,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/internet/12/25/internet.domains.ap (last visited Apr. 12,
2004).
4
See, e.g., Jon Swartz, Sex.com Ownership Ruling Expected: Domain Name Hotly
Disputed, USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 2000, at 3B (stating that the adult entertainment network
built around the <sex.com> domain name is estimated to be worth at least $250 million
by some pornography executives).
5
See Brian Steinberg, Ads Target Stay-at-Home Travelers, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2003,
at B6.
6
See Jason Black, What’s In a Name?, INTERNET WORLD, July 15, 2001, at 20
(illustrating that the domain name <salary.com> is a self-branding company name),
available at 2001 WL 8972673. The Chief Executive Officer and founder of
<salary.com> advises that successful branding should involve selecting domain names
that are “‘memorable, short to type, and easy to spell.’” Id.
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that nearly ninety-eight percent of the words in Webster’s English
Dictionary are registered as domain names.7
Just when it seemed that all hope was abandoned for businesses
that entered into cyberspace, American consumers spent a
staggering $18.5 billion online during the 2003 holiday season.8
The typical American Internet user visited fifty-five domain names
at home and ninety-nine at work on average during the month of
December alone.9 Moreover, analysts predict that online sales may
total up to $65 billion this year and swell by 17 percent over the
next 5 years, reaching a whopping $117 billion by 2008.10
What all of these statistics and exorbitant dollar amounts
represent are consumers’ rapidly growing reliance on the Internet11
and a surge of opportunities for American businesses in
7

Rhea Wessel, ‘Dot.coms’ Furnish English Language with German-Like Gigantic
Names, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2000, at B17D.
8
Press Release, Nielsen//NetRatings, Online Consumers Spent $18.5 Billion During
2003 Holiday Season, According to the Goldman Sachs, Harris Interactive and
Nielsen//NetRatings Holiday ESpending Report (Jan. 5, 2004), available at
http://www.nielsennetratings.com/news.jsp (last visited Apr. 2, 2004). Online holiday
spending jumped thirty-five percent from the 2002 season. Id.
9
Cyberatlas.com, U.S. Web Usage and Traffic, December 2003, at http://cyberatlas.internet.com/big_picture/traffic_patterns/article/0,,5931_3301321,00.ht-ml (last updated
Jan. 27, 2004) (citing a Nielson//NetRating report in 2003).
10
Matt Hines, Report: Online Shopping Still A-Hopping, CNET News.com, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1030-5143637.html (last modified Jan. 20, 2004) (citing a
report by Juniper Research). Over the next five years, the average amount spent by the
online consumer may reach $780 annually. Id. Moreover, the number of people making
purchases online will reach sixty-seven percent before showing signs of slowing down.
Id.
11
In March 2004, it was reported that the number of Americans who have access to the
Internet from the home increased to 204.3 million, or nearly 75 percent of the population,
up 9 percent from just a year ago. See Press Release, Nielsen//NetRatings, Three Out of
Four Americans Have Access to the Internet, According to Nielsen//NetRatings (Mar. 18,
2004), available at http://www.nielsennetratings.com/news.jsp (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).
Women now also represent a higher proportion of at-home Web surfers. A
Nielsen//NetRatings analyst attributes this to the fact that “[w]omen make the majority of
purchases and household decisions[, thus,] it’s no surprise that they are utilizing the
Internet as a tool for daily living.” Id. (citations omitted). In addition, the worldwide use
of the Internet has grown significantly over the last several years. Nua.com, How Many
Online?, at http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online/index.html (last visited Apr. 6,
2004). In September 2002, Internet users worldwide totaled 605.6 million. Id. This
number is more than triple the number of Internet users in the world in September 1999,
which was only 201.05 million. Nua.com, Worldwide, at http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online/world.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2004).
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cyberspace. With thousands or even millions of dollars at stake, ecompanies understandably want to protect their online endeavors.12
And branding may be the key to surviving online.13 Yet, because
generic domain names (“GDNs”)14 contain generic terms, causes
of action premised on federal trademark infringement and unfair
competition are likely to be limited, or foreclosed altogether, for ecompanies that hold GDNs.15
Foreclosing such avenues of protection on the grounds of
genericism ignores the unique nature of domain names. Unlike
traditional marks, domain names are unique because there can be
only one user of any given domain name.16 This fact alone urges a
closer look at GDNs before courts rigidly apply the rules of
genericism to bar avenues of protection. Although GDNs contain
generic terms, they are not classifiable as generic marks overall.17
12

See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Cyberproperty and Judicial Dissonance: The Trouble
with Domain Name Classification, 10 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 183, 186–90 (2001)
[hereinafter Nguyen, Cyberproperty and Judicial Dissonance] (discussing the rising
value of domain names that contain generic terms).
13
Professor J. Thomas McCarthy explained the importance of the branding:
Both consumer and producer would fare badly in a world without the
distinguishing function served by trademarks. If there were no way to tell good
products from the poor products, why bother to sell anything but the poorest?
When a consumer is faced with competing products and services from which he
can choose, there must be some system of trade symbols that identify and
distinguish each competitor’s wares . . . .
1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3:5, at
3-4 (4th ed. 2003).
14
As used in this Note, a domain name that contains a generic term is referred to as a
generic domain name (“GDN”). A GDN includes both the second-level domain (“SLD”)
and the top-level domain (“TLD”). For further discussion of SLDs and TLDs, see infra
Part I.B.
15
See, e.g., Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce: Move Over
Inherently Distinctive Trademarks—The E-Brand, I-Brand and Generic Domain Names
Ascending to Power?, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 937, 962–69 (2001) [hereinafter Nguyen,
Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce] (suggesting that GDNs never will be entitled to
trademark protection).
16
E.g., Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that each Web page must have a unique domain name);
InterNIC.net, The Domain Name System: A Non-Technical Explanation – Why Universal
Resolvability Is Important, at http://www.internic.net/faqs/authoritative-dns.html (last
updated Oct. 5, 2002) [hereinafter InterNIC.net, A Non-Technical Explanation]
(explaining that identical domain names cannot function within the domain name
system).
17
See discussion infra Part I.A.
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As cyberspace continues to grow exponentially,18 so do the
possibilities of competitors in the same industry who adopt
“parasitic,” or confusingly similar, domain names in order to free
ride on the branding and goodwill developed by successful GDN
holders.19 GDN holders, who have invested extensive time,
money, and energy in their businesses, deserve protection against
such unfair trade practices.20 In addition, consumers who have
come to depend on the services provided by these well-known ecompanies should not be subjected to the deception created by the
use of parasitic domain names.21
This Note will reveal that the scope of trademark and unfair
competition law under the Lanham Act22 is sufficiently broad so as
to provide protection to GDNs, notwithstanding the prejudice of
the genericness doctrine against generic marks.23 Specifically, this
18
In December 2003, the net total of registered domain names worldwide containing
the TLDs, “.com,” “.org.,” and “.net,” summed 32,894,380, representing a growth in the
millions within just one year. Zooknic Internet Intelligence, History of gTLD Domain
Name Growth, at http://www.zooknic.com/domains/counts.html (last visited Apr. 12,
2004). At that same time, 2,025,045 domain names with the relatively new TLDs, “.biz”
and “.info,” were registered worldwide. Id.
19
See, e.g., Nick Wingfield, Internet Companies See Value in Misaddressed Web
Traffic, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 2003, at B1 (illustrating how new e-companies set out to
capitalize on Internet users who mistype Web addresses); Ira S. Nathenson, Comment,
Showdown at the Domain Name Corral: Property Rights and Personal Jurisdiction Over
Squatters, Poachers and Other Parasites, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 911, 927–29 & n.66 (1997)
(describing the problem of parasitic registrations of domain names that are confusingly
similar to well-known marks and providing some examples of disputes between parasitic
domain name registrants and owners of the corresponding well-known marks).
20
See discussion infra Part IV.
21
See id.
22
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2000). This Note focuses on the confusion created by
competitors that attempt to capitalize on established GDNs within the same industry. For
this reason, the potential resolution arising from trademark dilution law, which provides a
cause of action regardless of inter-industry competition and likelihood of confusion, is
outside the scope of this Note. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining dilution).
23
The Third Circuit outlined the genericness doctrine in A.J. Canfield Co. v.
Honickman:
The genericness doctrine prevents trademarks from serving as the substitutes
for patents, and protects the public right to copy any non-patented, functional
characteristic of a competitor’s product. Trademark law seeks to provide a
producer neither with a monopoly over a functional characteristic it has
originated nor with a monopoly over a particularly effective marketing phrase
[unless] it is necessary to enable consumers to distinguish one producer’s goods
from others and even then only if the grant of such a monopoly will not
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Note will argue (1) that the unique character of GDNs justifies a
reevaluation of the law to protect against the use of confusing
similar domain names and (2) that GDNs should be protectable
upon a substantial showing of secondary meaning and a likelihood
of confusion to Internet consumers. Part I will discuss the current
state of protection granted to domain names according to the
policies of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). It
will focus on GDNs and how the genericness doctrine operates to
preclude their protection. Part II will examine the Second Circuit’s
deviating treatment of traditional generic marks with respect to
unfair competition claims. It also will discuss case law involving
vanity phone numbers, which are frequently analogized to domain
names. Part III will assemble the established principles of law and
apply them in the context of GDNs. Finally, Part IV will propose a
federal claim for GDN protection and fashion an appropriate
remedy for prevailing GDN holders.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF DOMAIN NAMES
Trademarks have moved substantially away from their limited
role as indicators of physical origin24 and are now viewed as
necessary (1) to ensure consumers’ rights not to be confused25 and
(2) to protect the expenditures, time, and energy of trademark
owners in creating and developing goodwill.26 The Lanham Act
generally provides federal trademark protection for “any word,
name, symbol, or device” that is adopted and commercially used
substantially disadvantage competitors by preventing them from describing the
nature of their goods.
808 F.2d 291, 305 (3d Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
24
See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 3:8, at 3-17 to 3-18 (describing the early view of
trademarks as indicating a source of physical origin). As trademark law developed, the
courts relaxed their rigid view of trademark function and regarded trademarks as
indicating a single source. Id. § 3:9, at 3-18 to 3-19.
25
Section 32(a) of the Lanham Act provides, in pertinent part, that “any reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark . . . which such use is likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . shall be liable in a civil action
by the registrant . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)–(b).
26
See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 2:2, at 2-3 (referring to a company’s right to
enjoy the fruits of its investments in the goodwill and reputation of its mark (citing Nat’l
Color Labs., Inc. v. Philip’s Foto Co., 273 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967))).
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by a company to distinguish its goods and services from those of
others.27 Under section 32(1) of the Lanham Act (“Section
32(1)”), the infringing use of a “registered mark” that is likely to
cause public confusion is liable in civil action.28 A mark is
registrable on the USPTO’s principal register unless it is used in
connection with goods that are “merely descriptive.”29 Therefore,
a mark that is deemed merely descriptive is neither eligible for
principal register registration nor shielded against presumptively
infringing use.30
According to section 2(f) of the Lanham Act (“Section 2(f)”),
however, a company may register a descriptive mark on the
principal register if it later can prove that the mark has become
“distinctive.”31 In the meantime, descriptive marks may be
registered on the USPTO’s supplemental register under section
23(a) of the Lanham Act if they are “capable of distinguishing the
applicant’s goods or services,” though they are not accorded fullfledged trademark status.32
27

15 U.S.C. § 1127.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
29
15 U.S.C. § 1052(e); see Application of Colonial Stores, Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 551
(C.C.P.A. 1968) (stating that one test to determine whether a mark is “merely
descriptive” involves asking what the mark “would mean to the potential consumer when
applied to applicant’s goods”). Registration on the principal register is only prima facie
evidence of the validity of a trademark. See infra note 32. An additional showing must be
made that the trademark is “use[d] in commerce.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1114.
30
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1052(e). For a discussion of the principal and supplemental
registers, see infra note 32.
31
See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (finding that evidence that a mark has become distinctive
includes “proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a mark by the
applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on which the claim of
distinctiveness is made”); see also 1-3 JEROME GILSON & JEFFREY M. SAMUELS,
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 3.04[6][b][i], at 3-130.25 (2003) (explaining
that if a descriptive mark has “become so closely associated with a mark owner’s product
or service it may be held to be distinctive and, therefore, registerable”).
32
15 U.S.C. § 1091(a). The principal register differs from the supplemental register in
that it confers certain substantive and procedural advantages that are not afforded to
supplemental register registrations. See 1-3 GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 31, § 3.04[3],
at 3-100. For example, registration on the principal register “communicates nationwide
constructive notice, constitutes prima facie or conclusive evidence of the exclusive right
to use the mark in interstate commerce, [and] becomes incontestable under certain
circumstances . . . .” Id. § 3.04[3][a], at 3-100. These advantages do not exist for marks
registered on the supplemental register. Id. Registration on the supplemental register,
however, offers other benefits, such as “notice of the registrant’s claim of rights to
28
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The next sections discuss the traditional requirements that
domain names must meet to be eligible for Section 32(a) standing.
Trademark registration often hinges on the level of the mark’s
distinctiveness.33 The classification of GDNs as generic marks, the
lowest level of distinctiveness, negatively impacts their chances of
making it on either the principal or supplemental register.34
Because the USPTO chooses to examine GDNs as generic marks,
GDNs are almost always doomed.35
A. Traditional Trademark Analysis of Domain Names
Domain names currently must meet the same two requirements
to merit protection as do traditional trademarks and service
marks:36 (1) they must serve as a source identifier; and (2) they
must be distinctive.37 As to the first requirement, “a domain name
can become a trademark if it is used as a trademark.”38 The dual
nature of domain names—one as business names and the other as
locators on the Internet39—slightly complicates the matter. As
locators, domain names are the easiest method by which Internet
anyone who searches the Patent and Trademark Office records.” Id. § 3.04[3][c], at 3-102
to 3-103.
33
See infra Part I.A.
34
See infra Parts I.A–.B.
35
See infra Part I.B. Occasionally, GDNs make it on the supplemental register. See In
re Martin Container, Inc., No.75/533,426, 2002 TTAB LEXIS 566, at *4–*5 (Trademark
Trial & App. Bd. Sept. 4, 2002) (on reconsideration) (pointing out that <books.com> and
<officesupplies.com> are registered on the supplemental register, but that the TTAB is
not bound by the prior decisions of trademark examining attorneys).
36
Domain names are generally considered service marks because they represent
services available online. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 7:17.1, at 7-28 to 7-29.
According to the Lanham Act, service marks are treated in the same way as trademarks:
“service marks shall be registrable, in the same manner and with the same effect as are
trademarks, and when registered they shall be entitled to the protection provided in this
chapter in the case of trademarks.” 15 U.S.C. § 1053 (2000).
37
See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 3:1, at 3-2 (explaining that the function of a
trademark is to identify the source of the goods and to distinguish the goods from others
on the market).
38
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 7:17.1, at 7-25.
39
See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 956 (C.D.
Cal. 1997) (observing that domain names “present a special problem . . . because they are
used for both a non-trademark technical purpose, to designate a set of computers on the
Internet, and for trademark purposes, to identify an Internet user who offers goods or
services on the Internet”).
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users can find Web sites.40 Rather than memorizing a Web site’s
Internet protocol address, which consists of a string of numbers,
Internet users simply can type in a convenient domain name.41
According to the district court in Lockheed Martin Corp. v.
Network Solutions, Inc., when domain names are “used only to
indicate an address on the Internet, [they are] not functioning as a
trademark.”42 Domain names must do more than route Internet
users to the appropriate Web sites in order to merit protection—the
domain name must identify the source of the goods or services.43
The Lockheed court suggests, therefore, that the utilitarian nature
of a domain name cannot give rise to trademark status unless the
domain name is telling of the particular e-business that is offering
the goods or services.44
Relevant to the second requirement of traditional trademark
analysis is the “spectrum of distinctiveness,” which identifies five
categories of marks that vary in terms of protection: fanciful,
arbitrary, suggestive, descriptive, and generic.45 The first three
categories of marks—fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive—receive
immediate protection upon adoption and use because they are
presumed to be inherently distinctive and capable of identifying
the source.46 In cases where the distinctiveness of the domain
name turns on the distinctiveness of the corresponding traditional
40

See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A specific web site is most easily located by using its domain
name.”).
41
See Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 952 (describing the structure of Internet protocol
numbers).
42
Id. at 956.
43
See id.; U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING
PROCEDURE [TMEP] § 1209.03(m) (3d ed., rev. 2, 2003) (stating that “[a] mark
comprised of an Internet domain name is registrable as a trademark or service mark only
if it functions as an identifier of the source of goods or services”).
44
See Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 956.
45
See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir.
1976) (identifying only four main categories of marks by collapsing fanciful and arbitrary
into one category). There is a distinction between fanciful and arbitrary terms, and some
courts have referred to them as two separate categories. See, e.g., Butcher Co. v.
Bouthout Constr., Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 750, 754 (D. Me. 2001); Majestic Drug Co. v.
Olla Beauty Supply, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 0046, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 900, *8 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 29, 1997).
46
See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10–11; 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 15:1, at 15-5.
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trademark from which it was adopted, determining which category
the domain name falls under is easy.47 For instance, because the
traditional trademark “MovieBuff” for computer software
providing entertainment-related information is suggestive of its
product, its matching domain name <moviebuff.com> likewise
would be considered inherently distinctive by a court.48 In this
context, however, e-companies that adopt domain names as their
primary business names must undergo classification analysis based
solely on their domain names.
Descriptive marks do not gain protection unless the mark
Descriptive marks
holder can show secondary meaning.49
“‘forthwith convey[] an immediate idea of the ingredients,
qualities or characteristics of the goods.’”50 Secondary meaning is
the concept that some marks, although not inherently distinctive,
can become “uniquely associated with that person’s goods, service,
or business” in the public’s mind.51 Judge Arthur Carter Denison
of the Sixth Circuit best articulated the doctrine of secondary
meaning in 1912:
It contemplates that a word or phrase originally, and in that
sense primarily, incapable of exclusive appropriation with
reference to an article on the market, . . . might nevertheless
have been used so long and so exclusively by one producer
with reference to his article that, in that trade and to that
branch of the purchasing public, the word or phrase had
come to mean that the article was his product; in other
words, had come to be, to them, his trade-mark. So it was

47

See, e.g., Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1046–47, 1058–59 (9th Cir. 1999).
48
See id. at 1041, 1058–59. The Ninth Circuit disregarded the “.com” component in
<moviebuff.com> and concluded that the “moviebuff” component was identical to the
plaintiff’s traditional trademark, “MovieBuff.” Id. at 1055.
49
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000)
(citing Qualitex Co., v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162–63 (1995));
Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10.
50
Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11 (quoting Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs.,
Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
51
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 cmt. e (1995).
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said that the word had come to have a secondary meaning
. . . .52
This exception for descriptive marks that have acquired secondary
meaning suggests that public perception plays a significant role in
determining whether a mark legitimately functions as a
trademark.53
In some cases, however, even if the public is aware that there is
only one source for a product, the de facto secondary meaning
doctrine dictates that the term used in the mark must remain free
for competitive use if the term is in fact the commonly recognized
name of the goods.54 The public, Internet users especially, are
probably aware that each domain name is the only one in existence
over the entire Internet and in the entire world. Whether the de
facto secondary meaning doctrine potentially could invalidate the
protection of virtually all descriptive domain names remains a
possibility.
Generic marks, on the far end of the spectrum, are almost never
protected even upon a showing of secondary meaning.55 Generic
52

G.&C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912). This court
concluded that the plaintiff publisher’s title, Webster’s Dictionary and variations thereof,
had acquired secondary meaning and could not be used by the defendant unless
accompanied by a disclaimer. See id. at 378–79.
53
See, e.g., Dart Drug Corp. v. Schering Corp., 320 F.2d 745, 748 n.10 (D.C. Cir.
1963) (asserting that “confusion to the public is the essence of both trademark
infringement and unfair competition” (citation omitted)).
54
See Am. Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 822 (4th Cir. 2001) (asserting
that “the repeated use of ordinary words functioning within the heartland of their ordinary
meaning, and not distinctively, cannot give AOL a proprietary right over those words,
even if an association develops between the words and AOL”); A.J. Canfield Co. v.
Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 304 (3d Cir. 1986) (opining that “some terms so directly
signify the nature of the product that interests of competition demand that other producers
be able to use them even if the terms have or might become identified with a source and
so acquire ‘de facto’ secondary meaning”).
55
See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9 (stating that “even proof of secondary meaning . . .
cannot transform a generic term into a subject for trademark”); see also Miller Brewing
Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1977) (concluding that
generic terms may not become a trademark under any circumstances); In re Med.
Disposables Co., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1805 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. 1992)
(holding that because the board “found the term MEDICAL DISPOSABLES to be
generic, the question of whether or not it [had] acquired secondary meaning [was]
irrelevant”).
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marks are “common names that the relevant purchasing public
understands primarily as describing the genus of goods or services
being sold” and “by definition [are] incapable of indicating a
particular source of the goods or services.”56 Known as the
genericness doctrine, courts are principally concerned with the
monopolization over the generic terms that are necessary for
subsequent competitors to do business, which results from the
grant of trademark protection.57 The Lanham Act authorizes courts
to grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity,58
and enjoining the use of generic terms is aimed to preserve
competition within an industry.59 This genericness doctrine
represents a significant public policy choice in trademark law and
lays down a barrier against the protection of generic marks.60 As
Professor J. Thomas McCarthy explained, “To grant an exclusive
right to one [company] of use of the generic name of a product
would be equivalent to creating a monopoly in that particular
product, something that the trademark laws were never intended to
accomplish.”61
Section 2(f), however, suggests that marks may earn a place on
the USPTO’s principal register if they have become distinctive, or
have acquired secondary meaning.62 Generic marks never fall
within the Section 2(f) exception, though, because courts have

56

In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see In
re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(emphasizing that generic marks are “incapable of indicating source” and are “the
antithesis of trademarks” (citing Dan Robbins & Assocs., Inc. v. Questor Corp., 599 F.2d
1009, 1014 (C.C.P.A. 1979))).
57
See Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116–17 (1938) (declaring that
when competitors have the right to make a product, they also have the right to use the
term by which the public knows it); see also Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9 (stating that
protection of generic marks with secondary meaning would “deprive competing
manufacturers of the product of the right to call an article by its name”); supra note 23.
58
See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2000) (“The several courts vested with jurisdiction of civil
actions arising under this chapter shall have the power to grant injunctions, according to
the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable . . . .”).
59
See supra note 57.
60
See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 12:2, at 12-7 to 12-9.
61
Id. at 12-7 (footnote omitted).
62
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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reasoned that generic marks are fundamentally incapable of
becoming distinctive.63
B. Administrative Treatment of GDNs
While the law relating to the protectability of GDNs is not
developed in the courts, according to the trademark examining
attorneys at the USPTO and the appellate agency that reviews their
decisions, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”), it is
readily apparent that GDNs are not eligible for registration on
either the principal or supplemental register.64 The underlying
reason for this is that the USPTO’s guidelines for examining
attorneys, as set forth in the Trademark Manual of Examining
Procedure (“TMEP”), are averse to treating domain names as a
unique form of trademark.65
The main impediment to trademark registration is the USPTO’s
policy with respect to top-level domains (“TLDs”).66 A domain
name is composed of two main components: a second-level
domain (“SLD”) and a TLD.67
Using the domain name
<coffee.com> as an example, the term “coffee” is the SLD,
followed by the TLD “.com.” According to the TMEP, TLDs are
not accorded any trademark significance,68 and the TTAB and
reviewing courts agree.69 The TMEP states that TLDs “function to
indicate an address on the World Wide Web, and therefore
63

See cases cited supra note 56.
See generally U.S. Pat. & Trademark Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/ttab (last modified Mar. 10, 2004) (describing
the policies of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) and the types of
proceedings over which it presides).
65
See TMEP, supra note 43, § 1209.03(m).
66
See id.
67
See, e.g., Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999); see also supra note 14.
68
See TMEP, supra note 43, § 1209.03(m) (“Because TLDs generally serve no sourceindicating function, their addition to an otherwise unregistrable mark typically cannot
render it registrable.”).
69
See, e.g., Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1055 (finding that “‘MovieBuff’ and
‘moviebuff.com’ are, for all intents and purposes, identical in terms of sight, sound, and
meaning” and citing four other cases that found marks to be essentially identical when the
TLD “.com” was the only difference); In re Martin Container, Inc., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1058, 1060–61 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. June 11, 2002).
64
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generally serve no source-indicating function.”70 Thus, “if a mark
is composed of a generic term(s) for applicant’s goods or services
and a TLD, the examining attorney must refuse registration on the
ground that the mark is generic.”71 The TMEP cites <bank.com>
for an online banking service and <turkey.com> for an online
frozen turkey retailer as examples of unregistrable marks.72
In In re Martin Container, the TTAB affirmed the decision of a
trademark examining attorney in refusing to register
<container.com> on the supplemental register on the grounds that
the component terms were incapable of distinguishing the
applicant’s services.73 The TTAB, relying on the test set forth in
In re Gould Paper Corp.,74 found that the generic term “container”
combined with “.com” to form <container.com> did not create an
amalgamation that “somehow acquired the capability of
identifying and distinguishing applicant’s services.”75 Specifically,
the Gould test provides that the examining attorney may establish
genericness by showing that “separate words joined to form a
compound have a meaning identical to the meaning common usage
would ascribe to those words as a compound.”76 The TTAB in
Martin Container analogized the function of TLDs to that of other
generic indicators placed after company names such as “Inc.,”
“Co.,” and “LTD,” which merely identify the type of company or
corporation.77 Accordingly, the TLD “.com” only identified the
company as being an online entity.78 Consistent with the analyses
in prior decisions that refused the registrations of the marks “Paint
Products Co.” and “Office Movers, Inc.,” the TTAB concluded

70

TMEP, supra note 43, § 1209.03(m).
Id.
72
Id. § 1215.05.
73
See Martin Container, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060 (affirming the refusal of
registration under section 23 of the Lanham Act); see also TMEP, supra note 43,
§ 1215.05.
74
834 F.2d 1017, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that the mark “Screenwipe” for premoistened antistatic cloths used to clean computer and television screens was generic).
75
Martin Container, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.
76
Gould, 834 F.2d at 1018.
77
Martin Container, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
78
Id.
71
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that <container.com> was “no more registrable than the generic
terms would be by themselves.”79
The TTAB in In re CyberFinancial.Net, Inc. likewise affirmed
a trademark examining attorney’s rejection of <bonds.com> on the
principal register.80 The TTAB, in this proceeding, made its
determination based on the standard two-part test for genericness
offered by the Federal Circuit for traditional marks: (1) what is the
category of goods or services at issue; and (2) whether the term
sought to be registered is understood by the relevant public
primarily to refer to such category.81 The TTAB found that the
category at issue was the “electronic commerce services regarding
financial products . . . via the Internet” and that the public
somehow understood <bonds.com> to refer to that category.82
Drawing from the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Brookfield
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment,83 the TTAB
concluded that “.com” only signified the Web site’s commercial
nature and carried no trademark significance.84 It found that the
compound term—formed by combining “bonds” with “.com”—
was generic and stated that “the public would not understand
BONDS.COM to have any meaning apart from the meaning of the
individual terms combined.”85

79

Id. (citing In re Paint Products Co., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1863 (Trademark Trial &
App. Bd. July 8, 1988), and In re E.I. Kane, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1203 (Trademark
Trial & App. Bd. Feb. 16, 1984), as examples of cases where generic company names
combined with generic indicators were not adequately distinctive).
80
65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1789 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. Aug. 28, 2002).
81
See H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 991 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (holding that the mark “Fire Chief” for a magazine on the topic of firefighting
was descriptive and, therefore, valid after applying a two-part test to determine
genericism); see also Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938)
(establishing the primary significance test for genericism, in which a plaintiff must show
that the “primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the
product, but the producer”).
82
CyberFinancial.Net, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1790.
83
174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
84
CyberFinancial.Net, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1792 (stating that “‘second-level domain
names communicate information as to source’” (quoting Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1055)).
85
Id. at 1792.
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The TTAB also addressed its interest in preserving
competition.86 Applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning from an
1888 case,87 the TTAB stated that it was necessary for
<bonds.com> to remain available for other competitors in the same
industry, such as <acmebonds.com> or <unitedbonds.com>, so
that they could identify and distinguish their own goods and
services.88
II. UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW AND GENERIC TERMS
The flexible doctrine of unfair competition “encompass[es] a
broader range of unfair practices [than does trademark law,] which
may be generally described as misappropriation of the skill,
expenditures, and labor of another.”89 Marks that have not been
registered on the USPTO’s principal or supplemental register
nevertheless may gain protection under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act (“Section 43(a)”)90 in cases where “the term name is
so associated with [the owner’s] goods that use of the same or
similar term by another company constitutes a representation that
its good from the same source.”91 Section 43(a)(1)(A) allows
recovery for the use of “any word, term, symbol, or device” that is
likely to cause confusion as to the origin or association of one’s
goods or services with those of another.92
The following sections turn to the favorable, albeit rare,
treatment of generic marks within this area of the Lanham Act. In
86

Id. at 1793 (stating that “competitors should be allowed to freely use [generic] marks
. . . to identify and distinguish their services”).
87
Goodyear’s India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598,
602 (1888) (“Names which are thus descriptive of a class of goods cannot be exclusively
appropriated by any one. The addition of the word ‘Company’ only indicates that parties
have formed an association . . . .”).
88
See CyberFinancial.Net, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1793.
89
Am. Footwear Corp. v. Gen. Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 662 (2d Cir. 1979).
90
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000).
91
Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 149–50 (2d Cir. 1997).
92
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (providing a cause of action against any person who “uses in
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device . . . which . . . is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
association . . . or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services,
or commercial activities by another person”).
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particular, two Second Circuit decisions provide a remedial
platform to owners of traditional generic marks.93 Holders of less
traditional generic marks—vanity phone numbers—also sought
relief successfully in the Second Circuit as well as the Federal
Circuit.94 While holders of vanity phone numbers are not
uniformly entitled to an unfair competition claim,95 vanity phone
number cases may offer insight into the types of issues that arise
with respect to other less traditional generic marks, namely GDNs.
A. Hope in the Second Circuit for Generic Marks
The Second Circuit has provided some accommodation to
holders of generic marks by suggesting that a competitor’s
deceptive use of a generic term may support a claim for unfair
competition.96 In Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Systems,
the Second Circuit held that the “Murphy bed” mark was generic
and not entitled to trademark protection, but subsequently
concluded that its ruling did not preclude the Murphy Door Bed
Company from bringing an unfair competition claim based on
“passing off products.”97 The court opined that the defendant did
not violate the principles of unfair competition merely by selling
and advertising its products as Murphy beds; rather, the violation
arose when it intentionally misrepresented its beds as being those
manufactured by the company holding the “Murphy beds” mark.98
Similarly, the Second Circuit in Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh
Brewing Co. suggested that the use of plaintiff beer company’s
generic mark, “Honey Brown”—if closely associated with
93

See discussion infra Part II.A.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
95
See infra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
96
See Forschner Group v. Arrow Trading Co., 30 F.3d 348, 358 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that “[i]f there is a sufficient factual predicate for this allegation [of confusion as
to source], injunctive relief is warranted irrespective of whether the phrase Swiss Army
knife is generic”); Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir.
1989); accord Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded Ams. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035,
1043 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (concluding that “if an organization’s own name is generic, a
competitor’s subsequent use of that name may give rise to an unfair competition claim if
competitor’s failure adequately to identify itself as distinct from the first organization
causes confusion or a likelihood of confusion”).
97
Murphy Door Bed Co., 874 F.2d at 102.
98
Id.
94
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plaintiff’s beverage—would be impermissible when such use
would engender a likelihood of confusion as to the source.99 The
Genesee court articulated the two elements of an unfair
competition claim: “(1) an association of origin by the consumer
between the mark and the first user, and (2) a likelihood of
consumer confusion when the mark is applied to the second user’s
good.”100 Association of origin is synonymous with secondary
meaning and arises when consumers primarily associate a mark
with the producer of the goods or services, and not merely the
goods or services themselves.101 Therefore, a claim for unfair
competition based upon the use of a generic mark ultimately
requires that the claimant demonstrate “(1) something valuable to
lose (consumer good will), and (2) a likelihood that it will be
unfairly taken (consumer confusion),” at least in the Second
Circuit.102
Although the Genesee court acknowledged that
consumers and bartenders alike referred to the plaintiff’s beer
simply as “Honey Brown” and that the defendant company did not
take steps to eliminate public confusion in using the term, the court
held that preliminary injunction was an inappropriate remedy for
an unfair competition claim.103
B. The Vanity Phone Number Paradigm
With few judicial decisions surrounding GDNs,104 the law
involving vanity phone numbers that contain generic terms may
99

Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 150 (2d Cir. 1997).
Id. (citing Forschner, 904 F. Supp. at 1417).
101
Forschner, 904 F. Supp. at 1417; see also 2-7 GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 31,
§ 7.02[5][a], at 7-23 (“[The] implied requirement of Section 43(a) was variously called a
form of unique association, a ‘quality similar to secondary meaning,’ or ‘secondary
meaning.’” (footnotes omitted)).
102
Forschner, 904 F. Supp. at 1418.
103
Genesee, 124 F.3d at 151.
104
In one rare decision, E-cards v. King, No. 99-CV-3726 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2000), a
jury awarded an online greeting card company, who held the GDN <e-cards.com>, $4
million on its unfair competition claim against a competitor, who operated under the
name <ecards.com>. See Peter Brown, Protection of Trademarks and Trade Secrets in ECommerce, in SOLVING THE LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING B2B TRANSACTIONS, at 127, 142
(PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 650,
2001). The verdict in the E-cards decision is viewed by scholars and some practitioners
as effectively granting the online card company a monopoly over a generic term. Id.
100
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provide guidance because GDNs and vanity phone numbers have
several characteristics in common.105 Like GDNs, phone numbers
are unique because there can be only one holder of any given
phone number.106
Vanity phone numbers, such as 1-800LAWYERS and 1-800-FLOWERS, are dualistic; they serve as
both an identifier of a business and a locator by connecting wouldbe dialers.107 The USPTO’s policy with respect to dialing prefixes,
such as 800, 888, and 877, is the same with TLDs, in that dialing
prefixes are not accorded any trademark significance.108
Moreover, a generic term combined with a dialing prefix is not
eligible for registration on the principal or supplemental register.109
Domain names are also subject to a similar “parasitic” problem
that plagues vanity phone numbers.110 This parasitic problem
arises when competitors anticipate and take advantage of the
public’s misdialing, mistyping, or misspelling to create vanity
phone numbers or domain names that are confusingly similar to
existing ones.111

105

See, e.g., Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (observing that “[e]ach web page has a corresponding domain
address, which is an identifier somewhat analogous to a telephone number or street
address”); cf. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 7:17.1, at 7-26 (listing other legal
metaphors to domain names such as radio station call letters). Compare Ann K.
Linnehan, Need Trademark Protection for a Generic Domain Name? Help May Be Just
a Phone Call Away, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 503, 528–34 (2002/2003) (comparing the structure
of domain names to vanity phone numbers and urging that similar protection is justified),
with Christie L. Branson, Comment, Was $7.5 Million a Good Deal for Business.com?
The Difficulties of Obtaining Trademark Protection and Registration for Generic and
Descriptive Domain Names, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 285, 310
(2001) (arguing that the analogy of vanity phone numbers to domain names would result
in monopolistic practices whereby competitors would be prohibited from using generic
terms to describe their products).
106
See InterNIC.net, A Non-Technical Explanation, supra note 16 (“Think of the phone
system . . . when you dial a number, it rings at a particular location because there is a
central numbering plan that ensures that each telephone number is unique. The [domain
name system] works in a similar way.”).
107
See Branson, supra note 105, at 307.
108
TMEP, supra note 43, § 1209.01(b)(12).
109
Id.
110
See Nathenson, supra note 19, at 927, 968 (comparing parasitic domain names to
commonly-misdialed numbers that correspond to well-known vanity phone numbers).
111
See, e.g., id.
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A notable dissimilarity between domain names and vanity
phone numbers, however, is that phone numbers can contain only
ten digits whereas GDNs can contain up to sixty-three
characters.112 Thus, the range of available alternatives and word
arrangements is more limited with phone numbers than with
domain names.113
Four key cases illustrate the differing approaches to trademark
and unfair competition claims involving vanity phone numbers. In
Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page,114 a mattress retailer,
primarily doing business in the New York metropolitan area under
the phone number MATTRES (628-8737), sued a competitor for
adopting the confusingly similar phone number 1-800MATTRESS (628-8737).115 The Second Circuit declined to
decide the case solely upon traditional principles applicable to
generic terms and instead asserted that the mattress retailer “[did]
not lose the right to protection against [the competitor’s] use of a
confusingly similar number and a confusingly similar set of letters
that correlate with that number . . . just because the letters spell a
generic term.”116 The court opined that a competitor should not
remain free to confuse the public by using a deceptively similar
phone number.117 The Second Circuit further asserted that phone
112
See In re CyberFinancial.Net, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1789, 1793 (Trademark Trial & App.
Bd. Aug. 28, 2002). Although sixty-three characters is feasible, the average number of
characters in a domain name is only eleven. See Zooknic Internet Intelligence, Average
Length of Domain Names, at http://www.zooknic.com/Domains/dn_length.html (last
visited Apr. 6, 2004).
113
See infra text accompanying notes 132–31. For a detailed discussion comparing
vanity phone numbers and domain names, see Nathenson, supra note 19, at 966–69. Ira
S. Nathenson observes that with telephone numbers,
the letters “Q” and “Z” are unavailable. Further, since the numbers two (2)
through nine (9) on a phone each correspond to three letters, one mnemonic
word may preclude other words: 1-800-BEER-R-US is the same number as 1800-BEEP-R-UP, and 1-800-4-DOLE-96 is the same as 1-800-I-FOLD-96. . . .
Domain names, however, . . . may comprise almost any alphanumeric
character.
Id.
114
880 F.2d 675, 676 (2d Cir. 1989).
115
The Second Circuit noted that the mattress retailer was “not seeking protection
against a competitor’s use of the word ‘mattress’ solely to identify the competitor’s name
or product.” Id. at 678.
116
Id.
117
Id.
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numbers may be entitled to trademark protection and that
confusingly similar numbers may be enjoined.118
The same mattress retailer appealed the TTAB’s refusal to
register 1-888-MATRESS (628-7377) as a service mark in In re
Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp.119 The Federal Circuit held that
the vanity phone number was registrable on the principal register
on the grounds that it was descriptive and had acquired
distinctiveness.120 It did not analyze the dialing prefix “888” and
the term “mattress” as a combination of two generic terms, as
traditionally had been done under the Gould test.121 Instead, it
limited Gould as being “applicable only to ‘compound words
formed by the union of words’ where the public understands the
individual terms to be generic for a genus of goods or services, and
the joining of the individual terms into one compound word lends
‘no additional meaning to the term.’”122 The court concluded that
the Gould test was the wrong test to apply in this context.123 The
Federal Circuit likened 1-888-MATRESS to a “phrase” rather than
a compound word and adopted the commercial-impression-as-awhole test, in which a vanity phone number is considered as a
whole and not as separate components.124 Viewing 1-888MATRESS as a whole, the Federal Circuit concluded that the mark
was not generic because the relevant public did not refer to “the
class of shop-at-home telephone mattress retailers” as 1-888MATRESS.125 Given the ten-digit make-up of phone numbers, the
Federal Circuit observed that holding a phone number containing
the term “mattress” already has precluded competitors from using
that number “for all practical purposes,” and that further

118

Id.
240 F.3d 1341, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
120
Id. at 1347–48 (finding that 1-888-MATRESS was the “legal equivalent” of the prior
registered mark 212-MATTRES and, therefore, entitled to prima face evidence of
acquired distinctiveness).
121
See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
122
Dial-A-Mattress, 240 F.3d at 1345 (emphasis added) (citing In re Am. Fertility
Soc’y, 188 F.3d 1341, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
123
Id.
124
Id. at 1345–46.
125
Id. at 1346.
119
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precluding registration “merely shifts the race from the [USPTO]
to the telephone company.”126
In stark contrast to the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit in
Dranoff-Perlstein Associates v. Sklar127 refused to grant any
protection to a vanity phone number containing a generic term.128
A personal injury firm with INJURY-1 (465-8791) as its phone
number sued a competitor for doing business with INJURY-9
(465-8799).129 The Third Circuit adhered to traditional trademark
principles, which grant protection only to marks that are arbitrary,
suggestive, or descriptive with a showing of secondary meaning.130
It reasoned that protection for vanity phone numbers containing
generic terms would allow the first company to obtain such a
phone number to gain an unfair advantage over its competitors
“merely by winning the race to the telephone company.”131 The
Third Circuit observed that the ten-digit make-up of phone
numbers severely limited “the range of commonly used
alternatives which effectively communicate the same functional
information as the word ‘injury.’”132 It concluded that if the
personal injury firm were permitted to preclude competitors from
using “injury” in their phone numbers, “it would achieve the kind
of unfair competitive advantage the genericness doctrine is
supposed to prevent.”133
Rather than addressing the issue of mark classification or the
implications of the genericness doctrine, the Sixth Circuit in
Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc.134 focused on the public
confusion that potentially arises from the use of parasitic phone
numbers.135 The hotel chain Holiday Inns, which used 1-800126

Id.
967 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1992).
128
Id. at 857.
129
Id. at 853–54.
130
Id. at 855 (discussing the categories of marks under the Lanham Act and their
respective levels of protection).
131
Id.
132
Id. at 859.
133
Id. at 859–60. Ultimately, the Third Circuit remanded for a determination as to
whether there was a likelihood of confusion with respect to the mark as a whole. Id. at
863.
134
Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996).
135
See id.
127
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HOLIDAY (1-800-465-4329) to book reservations, sued an
independent booking service for employing 1-800-H0LIDAY (1800-465-0329).136 Dialers reaching the latter number immediately
received a recorded message notifying dialers of their misdial and
disclaiming affiliation to Holiday Inns.137 The Sixth Circuit
distinguished Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page by
pointing out that the competitor in that case had promoted its
vanity phone number so as to deliberately cause public
confusion.138 The Sixth Circuit opined that the independent
booking service merely took advantage of a “preexisting
confusion” on the part of the dialers—namely, the confusion
between the number zero and the letter O on the dial pad—but did
not itself “create” that confusion.139 The Sixth Circuit held that the
booking service did not use the Holiday Inns trademark nor engage
in misleading representation.140 The booking service, therefore,
did not violate the “plain language” of the Lanham Act.141
III. THE APPLICATION OF TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
PRINCIPLES TO GDNS
Mechanically labeling GDNs as generic marks, as trademark
examining attorneys and the TTAB do, necessarily evokes the
genericness doctrine.142 Contrary to traditional marks, however,
136

Id. at 621.
Id. The recorded message stated: “Hello. You have misdialed and have not reached
Holiday Inns or any of its affiliates. You’ve called 800 Reservations, America’s fastest
growing independent computerized hotel reservation service.” Id.
138
Id. at 624.
139
See id. at 625 (observing that the defendant in Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. had
promoted “1-800-MATTRESS” as its phone number in the same geographic regions as
the plaintiff was promoting its number, thereby causing confusion).
140
Id. at 626.
141
Id. The district court noted that the booking service was in clear violation of the
“spirit,” but not the “letter,” of the Lanham Act. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation,
Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1247, 1255 (E.D. Tenn. 1993), rev’d in part, 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir.
1996).
142
See, e.g., In re Allwall Techs., Inc., No. 75/879,693, 2003 TTAB LEXIS 395
(Trademark Trial & App. Bd. Aug. 19, 2003) (refusing registration of <art.com> as
generic); In re Mark Deitch & Assocs., Inc., No. 75/857,971, 2003 TTAB LEXIS 219
(Trademark Trial & App. Bd. May 13, 2003) (refusing registration of
<websitedesigns.com> as generic); In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, No. 78/061,755, 2003
137
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domain names are one of a kind. For example, only one
<coffee.com> can exist in cyberspace whereas an infinite number
of companies named Coffee Co. can co-exist in the offline
world.143 Hence, the main concern that the genericness doctrine
was meant to address—the free use of common words—is not
encountered with GDNs.144 In other words, permitting multiple ecompanies to freely compete with <coffee.com> is impossible.145
The touchstone of trademark and unfair competition claims—
ensuring consumers’ rights not to be confused146—is rendered
nearly inoperative in the GDN context. Due to the unique nature
of GDNs, there is no need to shelter consumers from confusion
arising from multiple competitors using the GDN <coffee.com>.
Legitimate concerns over restrained competition or likelihood of
confusion may arise when e-businesses adopt parasitic domain
names such as <coffeee.com>, <coffee.net>, or <coffeeonline.com>. Moreover, offline companies taking on deceptively
similar names to GDNs, or even identical names, may present
trademark infringement and unfair competition issues as well.
The following sections evaluate how traditional principles and
policies that have guided generic marks operate within the realm of
GDNs when their unique nature are accorded a more prominent
role in the analysis. Respecting their uniqueness presents novel
considerations in mark classification, while exposing the flaws in
the anticompetition argument underlying the genericness
doctrine.147

TTAB LEXIS 194 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. Apr. 16, 2003) (refusing registration of
<patents.com> as merely descriptive).
143
See supra note 16.
144
Regarding concurrent use on the Internet, Professor Michael B. Landau observed:
“On the Internet, the domain name form ‘trademark.com’ does not give any indication of
territory or of goods and/or services. Traditional concurrent use of a trademark by itself,
without alphanumeric modifiers specifying geographic market or goods and services in
the domain name, is unworkable.” Michael B. Landau, Problems Arising Out of the Use
of “www.Trademark.com”: The Application of Principles of Trademark Law to Internet
Domain Name Disputes, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 455, 472 (1997).
145
See supra note 16.
146
See supra note 53.
147
See infra Part III.A; see also text accompanying supra notes 57–61.
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A. Breaking Down and Sizing Up GDNs
Placing GDNs within the spectrum of distinctiveness, which
can be determinative of whether a protectable mark exists in the
first place,148 is not a simple task. One method used to classify
these marks is what the TMEP instructs in section 1209.03(m) for
the purposes of registration, and another possibility is derived from
the Federal Circuit’s approach to vanity phone numbers.149 The
diverging approaches of the USPTO, as conveyed through the
TMEP, and the Federal Circuit are revealing of the crucial role that
TLDs play in determining how GDNs should be appropriately
analyzed.150
1. Approaches to How GDNs Can Be Analyzed
Dissecting GDNs into their component parts and viewing them
only as a combination of generic terms almost always will render
GDNs generic marks and ultimately unregistrable.151 The TMEP
appears to handle GDNs as if they are compound words, by
subjecting them to Gould-like treatment152 and automatically
disregarding the TLDs.153 A TLD, by itself, does not have a
source-identifying function154 and rightly should not be given
trademark significance. But the TMEP’s instructions under section
1209.03(m) are problematic because they further assume that the
union of a TLD with a SLD produces no additional source
identification.155 Average Internet consumers arguably do not
break down a domain name into its TLD and SLD components, nor
do they attribute trademark significance solely to the SLD.156
<Coffee.com> would be recited in full as “coffee dot com,” and
148

See supra Part I.A.
See In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(finding that “1-888-MATTRESS” was registrable as a service mark because it had
acquired distinctiveness); supra Part I.B.
150
See infra Part III.A.1.
151
But see text accompanying supra note 65.
152
See text accompanying supra notes 74–79.
153
See TMEP, supra note 43, § 1209.03(m).
154
See supra Part I.B.
155
See TMEP, supra note 43, § 1209.03(m); supra Part I.B.
156
But see Branson, supra note 105, at 303 (suggesting that the public accords “little
significance” to the “www” and “.com” components).
149
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only then would it give off the impression of a coffee retailer who
does business on the Internet. The SLD alone, “coffee,” signifies
little without attaching a TLD.
In effect, the TMEP’s approach in section 1209.03(m)
forecloses any chance of registration to companies that operate
exclusively on the Internet, regardless of the possibility of
deceptive trade practices by competitors.157 The TTAB, in Martin
Container, chose to compare the function of TLDs to that of
generic indicators such as “Inc.” and “Ltd.,” and in doing so, made
a significant oversight: while it is true that “Inc.” identifies
extremely little about a company’s source, “.com” speaks to the
only possible source.158 The most that “Inc.” or “Ltd.” adds to a
term is the type of business entity, many of which can co-exist
with the same name and generic indicator.159 The TLD “.com” can
indicate the type of entity160 as well as the only entity when
attached to a SLD.161 Analyzing domain names as mere generic
components under the Gould test, therefore, underestimates the
“brand new” meaning formed by the union of a SLD and a TLD.
The Federal Circuit’s approach to vanity phone numbers
(commercial-impression-as-a-whole test)162 arguably makes more
sense as applied to domain names because it captures how the
157

But see text accompanying note 65.
See supra note 16.
159
See Sarah E. Akhtar & Robert C. Cumbow, Why Domain Names Are Not Generic:
An Analysis of Why Domain Names Incorporating Generic Terms Are Entitled to
Trademark Protection, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. 226, 234 (1999) (pointing out that several
companies can co-exist with the same name, even within the same industry).
160
See In re CyberFinancial.Net, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1789, 1792 (Trademark Trial & App.
Bd. Aug. 28, 2002) (finding that “.com” only indicated a Web site’s commercial nature);
In re Martin Container, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1058, 1060 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. June 11,
2002) (defining “.com” as “the code used to identify an Internet user as one operating (or
belonging to) a commercial organization (business)”) (citations omitted). Other TLDs
can identify types of entities as well. For example, the “.biz” registry is reserved for the
promotion of small and large businesses. Neulevel, at http://www.neulevel.biz (last
visited Apr. 5, 2004). Networking providers employ the “.net” registries, and non-profit
organizations commonly apply to “.org” registries. See Brookfield Communications, Inc.
v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999). The “.pro” registry was
established for self-certified professionals, such as doctors, accountants, and lawyers.
RegistryPro, at http://www.registrypro.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).
161
See supra note 16.
162
See text accompanying supra note 124.
158
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public realistically views domain names. <Coffee.com> is akin to
a phrase, or a sequence of words that are regarded as a meaningful
unit.163 Attaching “.com” to the end of “coffee” lends additional
meaning on the whole by indicating that the company’s services
are online, are represented by a commercial entity bearing some
relation to coffee, and, most importantly, originate from the only ecompany in existence with the domain name <coffee.com>.
2. GDNs as Generic Marks Overall?
A GDN, when properly analyzed as a phrase, does not fit the
traditional conception of a generic mark. Put another way, GDNs
do not pass as generic marks under the standard two-part test to
determine genericism.164 First, <coffee.com> is not the common
name that the relevant public understands to refer to coffee
retailers who do business on the Internet.165 <Coffee.com> is not
literally the genus of online coffee retailers.166 Second, as
discussed above, <coffee.com> is capable of indicating the source
of the services because the public recognizes that <coffee.com> is
the only source there is.
A complementary definition of a generic mark, which is tied to
free competition principles, depends on the competitors’ need to
use it: “if no commonly used alternative effectively communicates
the same functional information, the term that denotes the product
[or service] is generic.”167 While competitors engaged in the
online coffee business may need the word “coffee” to adequately
163

E.g., WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 829 (1995); cf. Linnehan, supra note
105, at 528–29 (“[A] top-level domain such as ‘.com’ is not a word and is not generic for
the services of the domain name. It is a code of reference used to signify the type of
organization identified by the domain name. Each of these codes—‘888’ and ‘.com’—
when combined with a word element like ‘mattress’ or ‘container,’ create a brief
expression. In other words, a phrase is created.”).
164
See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing the two-part test offered by the
Federal Circuit to determine whether a mark is generic).
165
But see Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce, supra note 15, at 956–66
(implying that the public immediately understands <www.wireless.com> to refer to
wireless services).
166
See text accompanying supra note 56.
167
A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 305–06 (3d Cir. 1986); see also
Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting
that the test articulated in A.J. Canfield is a useful complement to the test for genericism).

LE FORMAT

1120

8/6/2004 4:15 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 14:1093

describe their services, <coffee.com>, as such, is not a term that
competitors can use to compete because of the technical limitations
of the Internet. Thus, the need of several competitors to use
<coffee.com> concurrently would be impossible to satisfy.168
Even if GDNs escape from being labeled as generic marks, the
de facto secondary meaning doctrine169 might operate to prevent
any rights from being acquired in the GDNs. At first glance, the
de facto secondary meaning doctrine appears to apply to GDNs
because it refers to the situation in which the public is aware that a
single source for a particular service exists over a period of time.170
This doctrine, like the genericness doctrine, “reflects the legal
conclusion that . . . the term must be held free for competitive use
if it is in fact the commonly recognized name of the goods.”171
Because the rationale of the de facto secondary meaning doctrine
also anticipates the need for free competitive use, it also fails to
concede the non-duplicable nature of domain names.
GDNs fit tenuously within the definition of a generic mark.
The result of approaching GDNs as phrases, under the commercialimpression-as-a-whole test, is that GDNs seldom would be
considered generic marks. Although <coffee.com> is a service
mark that contains a generic term, it is not necessarily a generic
mark overall.
3. GDNs as Descriptive Marks
The category of descriptive marks is a better classification for
GDNs.172 For example, <pets.com> conveys the impression that
some service related to pets is available by visiting the Web site—
whether it be the online service of a pet seller, a pet supply retailer,
a pet care service, or a newsletter on the topic of pet care. The
Federal Circuit in Dial-A-Mattress stated that “the mark need not
recite each feature of the relevant goods or services in detail to be
168

See supra note 16.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
170
See supra text accompanying note 54.
171
JANE C. GINSBURG, JESSICA LITMAN & MARY L. KEVLIN, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 336 (3d ed. 2001).
172
The Second Circuit acknowledged that “[t]he lines of demarcation . . . are not always
bright.” Abercrombie & Fitch v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
169
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descriptive.”173 <Pets.com> would be sufficiently descriptive,
although not exact as to which type of pet-related services is being
offered.
Here, TLDs again introduce a novel consideration in the
classification of marks. TLDs are an indispensable component to
every domain name because a Web site cannot operate without
one.174 While TLDs lend meaning to GDNs on the whole, they
primarily serve a functional role.175 Yet, the very component that
transforms the GDNs into descriptive marks—the TLD—is
mandatory for all GDNs.176 Every company doing business
through a Web site must employ a TLD in its domain name, and
the types of TLDs available to select from are limited.177 The
necessity of TLDs, therefore, automatically forces descriptive
names upon e-companies. Nevertheless, <pets.com> more closely
resembles a descriptive mark rather than a generic mark overall.
That TLDs are required components of all domain names does not
mean that a domain name is less capable of functioning as a valid
trademark.
4. Arbitrary or Suggestive GDNs
The main focus of this Note is on e-companies that adopt
GDNs and provide online services having to do with the generic
terms involved—such as an online espresso machine retailer that
employs <coffee.com>—and whether those GDNs are truly
generic marks. An e-company might adopt a GDN for services
unrelated to the generic term and, thus, may encounter less of a
classification obstacle in the trademark examining attorney’s
office.178 Section 12.09.03(d) of the TMEP states that a “mark
173

In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(emphasis added).
174
See InterNIC.net, A Non-Technical Explanation, supra note 16.
175
See id.
176
See id.
177
In addition to “.com,” “.net,” and “.edu,” newly offered TLDs include “.aero,” “.biz,”
“.coop,” “.info,” “.museum,” and “.name.” InterNIC.net, InterNIC FAQs on New TopLevel Domains, at http://www.internic.net/faqs/new-tlds.html (last updated Sept. 25,
2002). The registry agreement for “.pro” is under negotiation. Id.
178
See TMEP, supra note 43, § 12.09.03(d); see, e.g., In re Colonial Stores, Inc., 394
F.2d 549, 552 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (holding that the mark “SUGAR & SPICE” for bakery
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comprising a combination of merely descriptive components is
registrable if the combination of terms creates a unitary mark with
a unique, nondescriptive meaning, or if the composite has a bizarre
or incongruous meaning as applied to the goods.”179 Accordingly,
<coffee.com> would be considered an arbitrary mark when it is
used to sell assorted candies online whereas <sugar.com> would
be a suggestive mark to sell the same. Both of these GDNs
arguably would be entitled to trademark registration and
protection, regardless of whether they are viewed as a combination
of generic terms or as a phrase, because they fall within the
inherently distinctive end of the spectrum of distinctiveness.180 A
GDN that is used in an arbitrary or suggestive manner may be
easier to recognize and may pose less of problem for registration at
the USPTO.181
B. GDNs Behaving Anticompetitively
As technology stands today, nothing can be done about the de
facto monopoly conferred to the holder of any given domain
name.182 <Coffee.com>, as such, is untouchable by online
competitors that desire the same domain name.183
Valid
anticompetitive concerns, however, may arise with respect to the
use of similar domain names, especially because GDNs
incorporate generic terms.
By obtaining a court-issued
184
injunction, the company holding <coffee.com> potentially could
enjoin competitors, such as <coffee.net> or <coffee-online.com>,
from using the term “coffee” in their domain names.
Analogizing GDNs to vanity phone numbers (as analyzed by
the courts in the Dial-A-Mattress decisions) may exacerbate these
products was entitled to trademark registration because the combined terms could
“function as an indication of more than a mere description of the ingredients of the goods
on which the mark is used”).
179
TMEP, supra note 43, § 12.09.03(d); see also supra note 178.
180
See text accompanying supra notes 45–46.
181
See supra note 178.
182
See supra Part III.A.2.
183
See id.
184
See 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2001) (establishing that courts with jurisdiction over civil
actions concerning trademarks may grant injunctions to prevent the violation of a
trademark holder’s rights).
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anticompetitive concerns. Although domain names resemble
vanity phone numbers in several ways, one dissimilarity remains
significant: many more variations of domain names are possible
using the same generic term because the SLD of a domain name
can contain up to sixty-three characters and can include alphabetic
letters, numerals, and hyphens, whereas vanity phone numbers are
limited to exactly ten digits.185 A GDN holder who successfully
brings a cause of action in the Federal or Second Circuits, by way
of analogy to vanity phone numbers, potentially could enjoin
competitors from using all of those variations over the entire
Internet.186 As a result, a system would be created whereby
trademark priority would be established according to the first to
scoop up a GDN by applying to a domain name registrar,187 which
screens domain names against multiple registrations.188 The first
to register a GDN with Network Solutions, Inc.,189 for example,
would be the first and only one able to commercially put it to use
and then get it onto the USPTO’s register.190

185

See In re CyberFinancial.Net, Inc., 65 U.S.P.Q. 1789, 1793 (Trademark Trial & App.
Bd. Aug. 28, 2002); text accompanying supra notes 112–13.
186
See Nathenson, supra note 19, at 968 (arguing that more possibilities exist with
similar domain names than in the case of telephone numbers).
187
See Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce, supra note 15, at 976–78;
Branson, supra note 105, at 310.
188
Domain name registrars administer domains names to prevent multiple entities from
registering the same domain name. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions,
Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 953 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (explaining the role of the registrar, National
Science Foundation, in screening domain name applications); InterNIC.net, A NonTechnical Explanation, supra note 16 (discussing the function of registrars). As one
registrar explains, “Registrars process name registrations for Internet end users and then
send the necessary [domain name system] information to a registry for entry into the
centralized registry database. The [domain name system] information is then propagated
over the Internet.” VeriSign, Naming and Directory Services, Frequently Asked
Questions, at http://www.verisign.com/nds/naming/faq.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
To maintain a Web site, an applicant must first register the domain name with a domain
name registrar. See InterNIC.net, InterNIC FAQs on the Domain Names, Registrars, and
Registration, at http://www.internic.net/faqs/domain-names.html (last updated Sept. 25,
2003).
189
Network Solutions, Inc. is the largest domain name registrar. See Network Solutions,
Inc., About Network Solutions, at http://www.networksolutions.com/en_US/aboutus.jhtml;jsessionid=FXEASTS15K1OGCWLEALCFEQ (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
190
See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2001) (requiring “use in commerce”); supra note 29.
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These anticompetition concerns would pose less difficulty if
the USPTO and the courts chose to grant only qualified GDNs—
i.e., those marks that are successful and widely recognized by the
public—protection. Any advantage that may result from firstcome-first-serve registration with Network Solutions is innate to
the domain name system; someone will always be the first to
register a GDN with a domain name registrar and become its sole
holder.191 This “priority system” would not necessarily grant a
monopoly to the first entity to dream up <coffee.com> and register
it with Network Solutions, as some argue.192 According to the
proposal below, it simply would allow the company holding
<coffee.com> the opportunity to earn and exercise the statutory
rights owed to it in accordance to Section 43(a) the Lanham Act.193
IV. FAIR PLAY IN CYBERSPACE: A PROPOSAL FOR
GDN PROTECTION
A competitor should not remain free to use a domain name that
is deceptively similar to a GDN that has achieved success and
recognition in the e-marketplace. Because “coffee” is generic,
<coffee.com> should not be able to enjoin e-competitors in the
same industry that merely use <coffeee.com>, <coffee.net>, or
<coffee-now.com>, but it should be able to sustain a claim against
competitors who deceptively use those domain names to pass off
their services as those belonging to <coffee.com>.194 Therefore, a
competitor does not engage in trademark infringement merely by
191

See supra note 187.
See, e.g., Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce, supra note 15, at 976–77
(arguing that a company that merely registers a GDN first gains an unfair advantage over
its competitors); supra note 187 and accompanying text.
193
But see Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce, supra note 15, at 976–77
(“Extending unfair competition law with respect to generic domain names will hinder the
growth of e-commerce.”). Specifically, Professor Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen opposes
injunctive relief in this context. Id. at 978.
194
Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15, cmt. d (1995) (“Use of a
generic term in a manner likely to deceive or mislead a significant number of prospective
purchasers as to the source of the goods or service, however, may subject the user to
liability under the general rule proscribing misrepresentations of source. . . . Subsequent
users, although protected in their right to use a generic term, may thus be required to take
reasonable precautions to avoid a likelihood of confusion.”).
192
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selling and advertising its services under the domain name
<coffeee.com>; it might, however, end up confusing the public in
doing so.195
The rules of genericism should not be rigidly applied to domain
names because they do not fit the mold of traditional marks. The
best way to approach GDNs is to revisit the two fundamental goals
of trademark and unfair competition law—protecting consumers’
ability to distinguish among services provided by competitors and
guarding the goodwill of mark owners196—and assemble a system
of protection that effectively serves those goals.
GDNs can be protected in such a way that remains faithful to
the spirit of the Lanham Act, without going beyond the letter of the
law. The law of unfair competition is sufficiently flexible to
provide protection to GDNs. Unlike Section 32(1), the broad
language of Section 43(a) does not require that the mark be
registered, which suggests that the insurmountable hurdle that
generic marks face in trademark law is not present in unfair
competition law.197 With no reference to the requirement of a
“registered mark,” Section 43(a) appears to extend trademark-like
protection to marks that are not registered or registrable.198 This
may mean that the search for the perfect classification of GDNs
has little bearing on the application of Section 43(a). As one
treatise explained, “Congress recognized that [Section 43(a)] fills
an important gap in federal unfair competition law and . . . it
expects the courts to continue to interpret the section
accordingly.”199 The Second Circuit’s refusal in Dial-A-Mattress,
therefore, to foreclose an unfair competition claim based on a

195

See discussion supra Part II.A.
See discussion supra Part I.
197
E.g., Forschner Group, Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co., 904 F. Supp. 1409, 1416
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“Although genericness prevents a word or phrase from attaining
trademark protection, it does not prevent a court from determining whether a
competitor’s later use of that word or phrase is unfair.”).
198
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2001) (establishing that any person who uses any word in a
manner likely to cause confusion, or misrepresents goods or services shall be liable).
199
2-7 GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 31, § 7.02[4], at 7-18.
196
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service mark containing a generic term was not an anomaly in the
law and was within the bounds of the Lanham Act.200
The spirit of the Lanham Act calls for the government to
safeguard businesses’ goodwill, and e-companies that adopt GDNs
should not be excluded.201 Categorically excluding GDNs from
protection would be accepting a tenuous classification of
genericism and ignoring the uniqueness that GDNs possess apart
from the familiar, yet outmoded, spectrum of distinctiveness. The
following sections propose a system of protection against unfair
trade practices for e-companies that hold qualified GDNs. The
proposed cause of action is crafted within the boundaries of the
Lanham Act and takes into consideration the backdrop of potential
anticompetition concerns.
A. Cause of Action for GDN Holders
A claim for the protection of a GDN should satisfy two
intertwined requirements: (1) the GDN has acquired substantial
secondary meaning; and (2) there is a likelihood of confusion
among the relevant public. The unique nature of GDNs goes to the
first requirement, but more than inherent uniqueness should be
shown. A showing of substantial secondary meaning additionally
ensures that the most deserving GDNs are protected.

200

But see Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce, supra note 15, at 976–77
(stating that “expanding [section 43(a)] to include competitor’s use of generic terms fails
to reconcile with other provisions in the Lanham Act that grant no trademark protection
to generic trademarks”).
201
In recognizing the importance of goodwill, the Supreme Court stated:
The protection of trade-marks is the law’s recognition of the psychological
function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that
we purchase goods by them. A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which
induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe
he wants.
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
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1. Establishing Substantial Secondary Meaning
While the majority of the public probably is aware that only
one given domain name can exist on the Internet,202 the public also
should be able to mentally associate an actual online service with a
particular GDN before secondary meaning is properly established.
Simply put, the GDN should be well known. Traditional factors
helpful in measuring the secondary meaning of GDNs may include
sales success, significant advertising expenditures, and favorable
evidence on brand recognition by consumers.203 An additional
consideration should be the efforts exerted to make the GDN
visible to the public, both online and offline, as is any other
traditional trademark.
This may include the frequency of
promotion on various media, such as on other Web sites, radio,
television, magazines, newspapers, or billboards.204 Other useful
factors involve the public’s affirmative actions to seek out the ecompany, as evidenced by the number of “hits” that the Web site
receives and the amount of unsolicited e-mails or letters that the ecompany receives from consumers.205
2. Finding Signs of Confusion
Under the proposed claim, secondary meaning is evaluated in
tandem with likelihood of confusion. While all of the above
factors establishing secondary meaning may demonstrate that
consumers are extremely familiar with <pets.com>, it does not
necessarily follow that consumers who nevertheless purchase from
202
See supra note 16; see also Akhtar & Cumbow, supra note 159, at 228 (suggesting
that the public appreciates that “.com” indicates an e-company and, therefore, a single
source).
203
Traditional factors of secondary meaning include (1) sales success, (2) advertising
expenditures, (3) studies on consumer recognition, (4) unsolicited media coverage, (5)
attempts to plagiarize the mark, and (6) length and exclusivity of the mark’s use. See,
e.g., Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217,
1222 (2d Cir. 1987).
204
See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 15:50, at 15-79 (suggesting that advertisements
may create a mental association in the public’s mind, including the minds of individuals
who never have purchased the goods).
205
See Genesee Brewing Co., Inc. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir.
1987) (referring to unsolicited letters that demonstrate that a large number of consumers
identify plaintiff’s beer as “Honey Brown”).
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<pets.net> mistakenly believe that they are purchasing from
<pets.com>. The factors pertinent to determining a likelihood of
confusion, as discussed below,206 should be simultaneously
considered to ascertain whether a GDN has secondary meaning. In
other words, a GDN that has secondary meaning is one in which
the adoption of a similar domain name by an e-competitor would
“constitute[] a representation that its goods come from the same
source.”207 The requirements of the proposed cause of action are
satisfied when a GDN is associated with its service in such a way
that Internet consumers are likely to be confused by a competitor’s
use of a similar domain name.
a) Limitations on GDN Protection
Before discussing the factors evincing a likelihood of
confusion, it should be first pointed out that a showing of actual
public confusion should not be overestimated, particularly when
the confusion is nominal.208 So-called initial interest confusion
should be insufficient to satisfy the second part of the proposed
cause of action. The concept of initial interest confusion has
gained popularity in cases dealing with the Internet.209 This is the
situation in which the adoption of a similar mark diverts
consumers’ attention from the original source that they were
seeking although by the time of purchase they are no longer
confused.210 The Brookfield court asserted that the “diversion of
consumers’ initial interest is a form of confusion against which the
Lanham Act protects.”211 Using this reasoning, another court
found that a “[d]efendant’s domain name and home page address
are external labels that, on their face, cause confusion among
206

See infra notes 219–17 and accompanying text.
Genesee, 124 F.3d at 149–50.
208
See infra note 219 (listing evidence of actual public confusion as a factor in
analyzing unfair competition claims).
209
See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1062 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that by using <moviebuff.com> to divert people looking for
“MovieBuff” products, the defendant “improperly benefits from the goodwill that
[plaintiff] developed in its mark”).
210
See id.
211
Id. at 1063 (citing Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394,
1043–46 (9th Cir. 1997)).
207
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Internet users and may cause Internet users who seek plaintiff’s
web site to expend time and energy accessing defendant’s web
site.”212 Accordingly, the adoption of a similar domain name that
operates to attract potential consumers’ interest may be actionable
even though the consumers thereafter rectify any initial confusion.
Liability for initial interest confusion alone is inappropriate
because the experience of the Internet has trained millions of users
to expect that they will not reach the Web sites that they want
every time. While an online consumer may land on the wrong
Web site, often only a few seconds may pass before he or she
realizes the mistake. A consumer looking to purchase dog collars
on <pets.com> may inadvertently land on the pet care newsletter
Web site called <pets.org>, yet will not be confused in a way that
should result in protection for <pets.com>. Consumers have come
to expect that locating a particular online pet supplier’s Web site
may require some trial and error.213 Another example is where a
consumer mistakenly types in or clicks on a link for
<potatoe.com> to reach <potato.com>. Recalling the concept of
“pre-existing confusion” from the Holiday Inns case,214 the holder
of <potatoe.com> may have intentionally adopted that GDN to
catch poor spellers or oblivious consumers, but did not itself create
that grammatical confusion. With well over thirty-five million
domain names in cyberspace,215 some imprecision in the process of
locating desired Web sites is inherent in the experience of the
Internet, regardless of the affirmative acts of the competing GDN
holder.216 Although the Lanham Act seeks to protect consumers’
ability to distinguish among the services provided by competitors,
212

Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1441
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (issuing an injunction in favor of the plaintiff, Planned Parenthood,
against the defendant, the host of Catholic Radio, in order to dispel confusion induced by
defendant’s domain name <www.plannedparenthood.com>).
213
See generally Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062.
214
See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 621 (6th Cir. 1996);
supra notes 135–41 and accompanying text.
215
This amount includes “.com,” “.org,” “.net,” “.biz,” and “.info” domain names only.
See supra note 18.
216
Compare how the Brookfield court distinguished the Holiday Inns case: “[Defendant
here] acted affirmatively in placing [plaintiff’s] trademark in the metatags of its web site,
thereby creating the initial interest confusion.” Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1065 (emphasis
in original).
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fleeting initial interest confusion on the Internet is of little concern
and should not be actionable.
The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Holiday Inns is helpful in that
it speaks to the overall Internet experience—no one creates the
imprecision in surfing the Internet for a particular Web site.217
But, at the same time, this inherent imprecision should not excuse
competitors from using deceptive trade practices or confusing the
public. The type of confusion that does raise the specter of
concern is a long-term confusion as to source, particularly when
the offending competitor provides similar services.218
For
example, consumers are confused as to source when they fully
believe that they are purchasing dog supplies from <pets.com>, but
in actuality the services are rendered by <petz.com>.
The traditional test for a likelihood of confusion typically
involves several factors,219 three of which are the most probative to
determining a likelihood of confusion in this context: (1) the
similarity between the GDN and the competitor’s mark, (2) the
proximity of the type of services, and (3) the competitor’s intention
in adopting a similar domain name.220 First, because identical
GDNs are not an issue,221 the similarity between respective domain
names should be the focus. For instance, <pets.net> is similar to
<pets.com> in that the same SLD is used; and <petz.com> is
similar to <pets.com> in that the alternate spelling does not change
the way which Internet consumers would pronounce the domain

217
See Nathenson, supra note 19, at 959–61 (describing the expectation of a typical
Web surfer as “an educated guess, rather than an absolute expectation”).
218
See 2-5 GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 31, § 5.01[3][c][iv], at 5-22 (defining
confusion as to source as the situation in which the public mistakenly believes that it is
purchasing goods manufactured by the original mark owner).
219
See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 286 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). The
Poloroid factors are (1) similarity of marks, (2) strength of plaintiff’s mark, (3) quality of
the defendant’s goods or services, (4) proximity of the goods or services, (5) likelihood
that plaintiff will bridge the gap, (6) evidence of actual confusion, (7) defendant’s good
faith, and (8) consumer sophistication. See id.
220
As the Brookfield court noted, the similarity of the marks and the proximity of the
goods or services are “always important” in a likelihood of confusion analysis.
Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054.
221
See supra note 16.
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name phonetically.222 Identical or similar phonetic pronunciation
may cause public confusion particularly when the Web sites are
verbally advertised, such as on the radio or television.223
Second, where a domain name such as <pets.biz> is a direct
competitor of <pets.com>, confusion is more likely.224 As the
Brookfield court opined, “The use of similar marks to offer similar
products accordingly weighs heavily in favor of likelihood of
confusion.”225 On the other hand, if <pets.biz> is an online
newsletter about pet care whereas <pets.com> is an online pet
supply retailer, the adoption of <pets.biz> is less likely to confuse
consumers who are looking to purchase particular pet supplies.226
Even further, if <pets.biz> provides banking services, then a
finding of confusion is much less likely.227
Third, inquiring into <pets.biz>’s justification for adopting its
domain name may lead to a presumption of a likelihood of
confusion.228 If <pets.com> offers proof that <pets.biz> was
intentionally trying to deceive the public, courts may presume that
such deception resulted.229 Comparing elements of the respective
domain names’ Web sites for similar colors, fonts, layouts, sound
files, or login and checkout procedures also may be relevant in

222

Cf. Nathenson, supra note 19, at 960 (explaining that a dispute arising over a domain
name readily suggests that the domain names at issue are highly similar).
223
Cf. Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y., 390 F.2d 728, 731–32
(C.C.P.A. 1968) (stressing the importance of phonetic similarity when the goods are of
the type frequently purchased by verbal order).
224
See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1056.
225
Id.; accord OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 188
(W.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that where two e-companies “compete for the same
audience—namely, Internet users who are searching for a web site that uses [a]
plaintiff[’s] mark as its address”—such a “high degree of competitive proximity increases
the likelihood of confusion among Internet users”).
226
See supra notes 224–22.
227
See id.
228
See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 23:110, at 23-273 to 23-275. Other courts
suggest that a defendant’s bad faith creates only an inference of confusion rather than a
presumption. See, e.g., Res. Developers, Inc. v. Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Found.,
Inc., 926 F.2d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that when bad faith is shown, “a powerful
inference may be drawn that the defendant has succeeded in confusing the public”).
229
See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 23:110, at 23-273 (explaining that proof of
intended confusion tends to show confusion in fact).
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determining whether <pets.biz> acted in good faith.230 For
instance, if <pets.biz> displays its name on its Web site by
emphasizing the “.biz”—i.e., the dissimilar portion of the mark—
in large, bold, blinking font, then such efforts to distinguish its
domain name would weigh in its favor.231 In addition, the
presence of an obvious and effective disclaimer may be indicative
of good faith or an effort to distinguish services.232
b) Confusion by Offline Competitors
Another type of confusion, confusion as to association, may
arise when offline competitors adopt names that are similar or
identical to online GDNs.233 If <pets.com> has acquired secondary
meaning, then the public is likely to be confused as to association
when a store called “Pets.com” or even “Pets.com Offline” opens
down the street.234 In addition to the similarity of the marks, one
of the factors that should weigh most heavily in determining
likelihood of confusion in this scenario should be whether the
GDN holder will “bridge the gap” in services.235 As one court
explained, “This factor contemplates ‘the senior user’s interest in
preserving avenues of expansion and entering into related
fields.’”236 Pets.com Offline may argue that it is providing pet
supplies in a different market than <pets.com>, namely the offline
230

See 3 id. § 23:52 (stating that the use of the same lettering, colors, and format weighs
in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion).
231
See 3 id. § 23:42 (“Although it is not proper to dissect a mark, one feature of a mark
may be more significant and it is proper to give greater force and effect to that dominant
feature. Thus, as a preliminary to comparing marks in their entireties, it is not improper
to downplay the similarity of very descriptive parts of conflicting marks.”).
232
Compare Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 1325, 1330 (2d Cir.
1987) (suggesting that the use of disclaimers can cure confusion effectively in markets
comprised of sophisticated consumers), with Home Box Office, Inc. v. Showtime/Movie
Channel, Inc., 832 F.2d 1311, 1316 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the burden to prove that a
disclaimer is effective is placed on the defendant).
233
See 2-5 GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 31, § 5.01[3][c][iv], at 5-22 (describing
confusion as to source as the situation in which the public believes that the offending
mark is associated or connected with the original mark).
234
See id.
235
See Lexington Mgmt. Corp. v. Lexington Capital Partners, 10 F. Supp. 2d 271, 286–
87 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); supra note 219.
236
Lexington Mgmt. Corp., 10 F. Supp. at 287 (quoting Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim
Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 504 (2d Cir. 1996)).
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market. But if <pets.com> has demonstrated that it is likely to
expand its online services and offer the same services in a physical
location in Manhattan, then a finding of a likelihood of confusion
may ensue.
Furthermore, the intention of Pets.com Offline in adopting its
name would be questionable and may trigger a presumption of
confusion.237 Even if it had a credible justification for adopting a
similar name, however, the well-known Dawn Donut rule
establishes that if “expansion were probable, then the concurrent
use of the marks would give rise to the conclusion that there was a
likelihood of confusion.”238 An e-company holding a GDN with
secondary meaning, therefore, may be protected from unfair
competition by its brick-and-mortar competitors if it intends to
cross over to the offline world.
B. Fashioning an Equitable Remedy
When a competitor is likely to cause consumer confusion, it
should be required “‘to use every reasonable means to prevent
confusion’ as to the source of the products.”239 As discussed,
issuing injunctions raises fears that the holder of <coffee.com>
effectively would gain a monopoly over the generic term “coffee”
in other domain names.240 The Genesee court acknowledged that a
competitor’s use of a generic term may not be enjoined
altogether.241 Rather, the holder of a GDN should be entitled to an
equitable remedy that is “no broader than necessary to cure the
effects of the harm caused.”242 The sensible remedy is to require
the offending competitor to distinguish its services and explicitly
notify consumers that its services do not come from or are not
associated with those of the prevailing GDN holder.243
237

See text accompanying supra notes 228–29.
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959).
239
Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 150 (2d Cir. 1997)
(quoting Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121 (1938)).
240
See supra Part III.B.
241
See Genesee, 124 F.3d at 151.
242
Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 1325, 1329 (2d Cir. 1987)
(citing Swann v. Charlotte–Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)).
243
See Genesee, 124 F.3d at 151 (quoting Forschner Group v. Arrow Trading Co., 30
F.3d 348, 359 (2d Cir. 1994)).
238
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The offending competitor could distinguish its services by
differentiating the appearance of its Web site, which may include
calling attention to the dissimilar portion of the GDN everywhere it
appears on the Web site—by using large fonts, bolding, or
underlining, for example.244 An explicit notification also should be
required in the form of a full disclaimer, as opposed to a hyperlink
to the disclaimer, placed at the top of each page of the Web site so
that it is quickly noticeable while the page is loading.245 Although
disclaimers may not be effective in some traditional contexts,246
their utility may be greater online because Internet consumers are
already sensitized to the fact that they will not always land on the
right Web sites. A disclaimer on <pets.biz> may dispel any
confusion quickly and aid consumers along in their search for
<pets.com>. A hyperlink to the prevailing GDN holder’s Web site
additionally should be provided alongside the disclaimer to direct
lost Internet consumers.247
As for offline competitors that are found to have caused a
likelihood of confusion as to association,248 courts should grant an
injunction in favor of prevailing GDN holders. Still, <coffee.com>
should not be able to prevent “Coffee Co.” or “Coffee Offline”
from opening on Fifth Avenue. But if an offline competitor takes
on “Coffee.com” or “Coffee.com Offline” as its name, which later
results in confusion to the public because <coffee.com> is taken in
its entirety, then injunction may serve as a reasonable remedy.
CONCLUSION
The present scheme of intellectual property protection under
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act can provide the proper analytic
framework for addressing GDNs. A policy change removing the
244

See supra Part IV.A.2.a.
But see Home Box Office, Inc. v. Showtime/Movie Channel, Inc., 832 F.2d 1311,
1315–16 (2d Cir. 1987) (reviewing academic literature that concludes that disclaimers,
which utilize negating words such as “no” or “not,” are frequently ineffective).
246
See id. (referring to scientific research demonstrating the lack of effectiveness of
disclaimers placed on football jerseys).
247
See Nathenson, supra note 19, at 961 (suggesting that hyperlinks that forward
Internet users to their desired Web sites may alleviate confusion).
248
See supra notes 233–35 and accompanying text.
245
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stigma of GDNs as generic marks is first needed, however, in order
to deal effectively with the reality of the Internet and the ability of
GDNs to function as true trademarks. The uniqueness of GDNs
has been a dominant theme in this Note’s analysis and ultimately
urges the conclusion that GDNs should be protectable upon a
showing of secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion of
Internet consumers. The application of the genericness doctrine is
wholly inappropriate in the context of these novel, yet sourceidentifying marks.
The proposed remedy preserves fair competition and helps to
allay concerns over monopoly, while also alleviating confusion
within the Internet community. Safeguarding the substantial
efforts of GDN holders in creating and developing goodwill, under
this proposal, comports with language of the Lanham Act while
faithfully upholding its fundamental goals.

